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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
trademark docket was quiet in 2011. The Federal Circuit issued only
1
2
six trademark decisions, designating two of them as precedential.
The court issued a considerably higher number of trademark
3
opinions in prior years.
The smaller number of trademark cases on the court’s docket
might be driven by economic considerations and the reduced
number of trademark applications filed in 2009 and 2010. In 2009,
352,051 trademark applications were filed, nearly 50,000 fewer than
4
the 401,392 applications filed in 2008. In 2010, trademark filings
5
increased slightly to 368,939. Given the average length of trademark
prosecution and timelines for proceedings at the Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board (TTAB), a disputed trademark application filed
in late 2009 or 2010 would generally be heard at the Federal Circuit
6
in 2011.
In recent years, several trademark appeals have reached the
1. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 665 F.3d 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V., 447 F. App’x 197
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., Nos. 2011-1052, -1053,
2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (per curiam); Citigroup Inc. v.
Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253 (Fed. Cir.
2011); Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., 425 F. App’x 886 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam);
Craig v. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc., 433 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per
curiam).
2. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089; Citigroup, 637 F.3d
at 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1253.
3. The Federal Circuit issued twenty-three trademark decisions in 2010 (eight
designated precedential), sixteen trademark decisions in 2009 (nine designated
precedential), eight trademark decisions in 2008 (one designated precedential),
fifteen trademark decisions in 2007 (eight designated precedential), and eleven
trademark decisions in 2006 (seven designated precedential). Susan B. Flohr et al.,
2010 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1159, 1160–61
(2011); Rebeccah Gan, 2009 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 1115, 1116 (2010); David M. Kelly & Stephanie H. Bald, 2008 Trademark Law
Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 947, 948 (2009); Susan M. Kayser &
David Jaquette, 2007 Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 57 AM. U. L. REV.
1039, 1040 (2008); Christine Haight Farley & Geri L. Haight, Review of the 2006
Trademark Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 987, 988–89 (2007).
4. Trademarks Dashboard, Data Visualization Center, Application Metrics (First
Quarter FY 2012), http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/trademarks/main.dashxml
(follow “Open the Excel datasheet” hyperlink).
5. Id. In 2011, the number of applications increased again to 398,667. Id.
6. See, e.g., id. (showing the average number of months from application filing
to final disposition at the PTO, including in cases involving an inter partes
proceeding at the TTAB, is fifteen months); see also U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FED. CIRCUIT, Median Time to Disposition in Cases Terminated After Hearing or Submission,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/stories/the-court/statistics/Median_Disp
_Time_table_02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2012) (showing median time for
disposition in cases appealed from the PTO to the Federal Circuit, from docketing
date to disposition date, is eight to eleven months over the last five years).
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Federal Circuit via district courts, the International Trade
7
Commission, and even the United States Court of Federal Claims.
8
All of the 2011 appeals, however, originated in the TTAB, an
administrative tribunal within the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO).
Five cases involved opposition
9
10
proceedings, and one involved a cancellation proceeding. Four of
the Federal Circuit’s trademark opinions primarily addressed
11
12
substantive trademark law, one covered a procedural issue, and
13
The
one considered both substantive and procedural issues.
Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decisions in all six cases.
Of the five trademark opinions that addressed substantive issues,
two were affirmed without opinion under Federal Circuit Rule 36
14
after the parties fully briefed and argued the appeals. While the
7. See, e.g., ERBE Elektromedizin GmbH v. Canady Tech. LLC, 629 F.3d 1278,
1280, 97 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1048, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (appeal from district court
involving both patent claims and trademark claims); Green Edge Enters., LLC v.
Rubber Mulch Etc., LLC, 620 F.3d 1287, 1290, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1425, 1427
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (appeal from district court involving patent claims and trademark
counterclaims); Deere & Co. v. ITC, 605 F.3d 1350, 1351, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1206,
1207 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (appeal from the International Trade Commission involving a
claim of trademark infringement based on gray market goods under the Tariff Act of
1930); Siler v. United States, 296 F. App’x 32, 32–33 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(appeal involving copyright and trademark claims against the United States, in which
the Federal Circuit concluded that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction
over trademark claims).
8. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 665 F.3d 1263, 1264, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1089, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V., 447 F.
App’x 197 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., Nos. 20111052, -1053, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (per curiam); Citigroup
Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253,
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., 425 F. App’x 886, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(per curiam); Craig v. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc., 433 F. App’x 901, 901–02
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
9. Estrada, 447 F. App’x at 198; Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1;
Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254; Dalton, 425 F. App’x at 887;
Craig, 433 F. App’x at 902.
10. Benedict, 665 F.3d 1263, 1264, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
11. Estrada, 447 F. App’x at 201; Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1;
Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1347, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1254; Craig, 433 F. App’x at 902.
12. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1269, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
13. Dalton, 425 F. App’x at 889.
14. Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (without opinion); Craig, 433 F.
App’x at 902 (without opinion). Rule 36 allows the court to affirm a lower court or
administrative agency decision without opinion when the opinion would not be
precedential and any of the following conditions exists:
(a) the judgment, decision, or order of the trial court appealed from is based
on findings that are not clearly erroneous; (b) the evidence supporting the
jury’s verdict is sufficient; (c) the record support summary judgment,
directed verdict, or judgment on the pleadings; (d) the decision of an
administrative agency warrants affirmance under the standard of review in
the statute authorizing the petition for review; or (e) a judgment or decision
has been entered without an error of law.
FED. CIR. R. 36.
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number of Rule 36 affirmances decreased from five in 2010 to two in
2011, the percentage of affirmances in 2011 increased: in 2010, the
Federal Circuit affirmed thirty-three percent of appeals of substantive
15
trademark issues without opinion; in 2011, the court affirmed forty
16
percent without opinion.
In the two precedential cases (one on substantive law, one on
procedural grounds), the Federal Circuit did not fully agree with the
TTAB’s analyses or the justifications for its final decisions. In
17
Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit
disapproved of the TTAB’s “reasonable manner” test to analyze
18
whether a likelihood of confusion exists between two marks.
Although the court affirmed the TTAB’s likelihood of confusion
finding, it stated that the TTAB should no longer use the “reasonable
19
20
manner” test.
Then, in Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., the court
21
determined that Trademark Rule 2.127(d) —which governs the
TTAB process and procedure after a dispositive motion has been
filed—is ambiguous and interpreted the rule’s effect on suspension
of a trademark proceeding after a summary judgment motion has
22
been filed. The court noted that the plain language of the rule does
23
not clearly coincide with the TTAB’s interpretation of the rule, and
this inconsistency can confuse practitioners about how the TTAB will
24
apply the rule. Despite this ambiguity, the court ultimately upheld
the TTAB’s decision based on the facts of the case and on other
25
TTAB rules.
The Federal Circuit’s 2011 trademark decisions are discussed in
detail below. When an opinion addresses more than one issue, the
issues may be broken up and discussed separately, particularly when
substantive and procedural issues are covered in the same opinion.

15. Flohr et al., supra note 3, at 1162.
16. Mag Instrument, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1; Craig, 433 F. App’x at 901.
17. 637 F.3d 1344, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
18. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59.
19. Id. at 1353, 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59, 1261.
20. 665 F.3d 1263, 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
21. 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2011).
22. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1267–68, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
23. Id. at 1267, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
24. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092. Pro se applicants, like Benedict, might be
particularly susceptible to confusion.
25. Id. at 1269, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092–93.
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SUBSTANTIVE TRADEMARK ISSUES
A. Likelihood of Confusion

Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Group, Inc.
In the first Federal Circuit trademark opinion of 2011, the court
affirmed the TTAB’s decision to deny an opposition filed by
26
Citigroup. In 2006, Capital City Bank (CCB) applied to register
several standard character marks that use the phrase “Capital City
27
Bank.”
Citigroup opposed CCB’s applications, arguing that
consumers were likely to confuse CCB’s marks (CAPITAL CITY
BANK, CAPITAL CITY BANK INVESTMENTS, CAPITAL CITY
BANK GROWING BUSINESS, and CAPITAL CITY BANC
28
INVESTMENTS) with Citigroup’s CITIBANK mark.
The TTAB applied the likelihood of confusion factors listed in In re
29
E.I. DuPont De Nemours to determine whether likelihood of
30
confusion existed under Lanham Act § 2(d). The TTAB found that
1.

26. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp., Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 1356, 98
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
27. Id. at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
28. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. At the TTAB, Citigroup also alleged a
dilution as a ground for opposition, but it dropped this claim on appeal. Id. at 1348–
49, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
29. 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The
DuPont likelihood of confusion factors are:
(1) The similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. (2) The
similarity or dissimilarity and nature of the goods or services as described in
an application or registration or in connection with which a prior mark is in
use. (3) The similarity or dissimilarity of established, likely-to-continue trade
channels. (4) The conditions under which and buyers to whom sales are
made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing. (5) The fame of
the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use). (6) The number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods. (7) The nature and extent
of any actual confusion. (8) The length of time during and conditions
under which there has been concurrent use without evidence of actual
confusion. (9) The variety of goods on which a mark is or is not used (house
mark, “family” mark, product mark). (10) The market interface between
application and the owner of a prior mark: (a) a mere “consent” to register
or use, (b) agreement provisions designed to preclude confusion, i.e.
limitations on continued use of the marks by each party, (c) assignment of
mark, application, registration and good will of the related business, or (d)
laches and estoppel attributable to owner of prior mark and indicative of
lack of confusion. (11) The extent to which applicant has a right to exclude
others from use of its mark on its goods. (12) The extent of potential
confusion, i.e., whether de minimis or substantial. (13) Any other
established fact probative of the effect of use.
Id., 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 567.
30. Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255. Section 2(d) of the
Lanham Act provides:
No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal
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four of the thirteen DuPont factors favored Citigroup, namely: (1) the
fame of Citigroup’s mark, (2) the similarity between Citibank’s
services and CCB’s services, (3) the similarity of trade channels, and
31
(4) the type of consumers.
But two significant factors—actual
32
After
confusion and the similarity of the marks—favored CCB.
weighing the relevant factors, the TTAB concluded that registration
33
of CCB’s marks was not likely to confuse consumers.
Citigroup
34
appealed that ruling to the Federal Circuit.
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit primarily focused on the factors
that favored CCB. Looking at the similarity of the marks, the Federal
Circuit said that the CITIBANK mark was too different from CCB’s
35
mark to cause confusion.
The distinctive “I” misspelling of
CITIBANK is actually what prevented it from prevailing on this
36
37
factor. The court drew from prior analysis of Citigroup’s mark,
which found that the “I” misspelling in Citigroup’s marks is key to its
38
trademark ownership and scope of protection.
The court also
noted that CCB’s marks include the word “Capital” with “City Bank,”
39
Although the
which distinguishes CCB’s marks from Citigroup’s.
presence of an additional term like “Capital” does not automatically
defeat a likelihood of confusion finding, here, the additional word
40
was one of several distinctions between the two marks.
The Federal Circuit also analyzed whether any actual confusion
existed. The TTAB had noted that the two banks had been operating
in the same geographic markets for over thirty-five years, but neither
41
party knew of any actual confusion. The TTAB found that the lack
of misdirected phone calls, requests for information, or other
evidence of confusion, combined with a long history of competition,
42
indicated that customers were not confused by the marks.
On
register on account of its nature unless it . . . (d) [c]onsists of or comprises a
mark which so resembles a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States by
another and not abandoned, as to be likely, with used on or in connection
with the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive . . . .
15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).
31. Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1348, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
32. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
33. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1255.
34. Id. at 1348–49, 98 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1255–56.
35. Id. at 1349, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
36. Id. at 1349–50, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256–57.
37. Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
38. Citigroup, 637 F.3d at 1350, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1256.
39. Id. at 1351, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257.
40. Id. at 1351–54, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1257–59.
41. Id. at 1354, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
42. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
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appeal, Citigroup argued that because not all of the opposed marks
had been used in commerce, the actual confusion factor should be
43
given less weight. The Federal Circuit, however, concluded that the
TTAB had enough evidence to find that no actual confusion
44
existed.
Citigroup also argued that the TTAB weighed the relevant factors
incorrectly. Citigroup contended that the TTAB should have found a
likelihood of confusion because a greater number of the DuPont
45
factors weighed in favor of Citigroup than in favor of CCB. The
Federal Circuit reminded Citigroup that the TTAB “may find a single
46
factor dispositive,”
and concluded—primarily based on the
dissimilarity of the marks—that “CCB’s marks are not likely to cause
47
confusion with Citigroup’s marks.”
The most notable part of the case was the Federal Circuit’s
instruction, in dicta, to the TTAB to abandon the “reasonable
48
manner” doctrine. The TTAB had adopted this standard to analyze
49
standard character marks. Under this doctrine, the TTAB would
first determine the reasonable variations of font size, style, and colors
in which a proposed mark might be displayed, and then decide if
those variations would be likely to cause confusion with the prior
50
mark. For example, if the TTAB did not think that red lettering on
a red background would be a reasonable way to show a mark, it would
51
not consider that option.
The Federal Circuit rejected the
“reasonable manner” approach, stating, “[t]he TTAB should simply
use the DuPont factors to determine the likelihood of confusion
between depictions of standard character marks that vary in font
52
style, size, and color and the other mark.”
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the “reasonable manner”
doctrine was not based on trademark law it had approved or adopted,
remarking that the doctrine “is unsupported by anything other than
53
TTAB practice.” Even though the court agreed with the TTAB’s
ultimate conclusion on the confusion issue, the Federal Circuit
43. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259–60.
44. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
45. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
46. Id. at 1355, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1260.
47. Id. at 1356, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
48. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59.
49. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
50. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59.
51. See id. at 1352–53, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258 (identifying several
proceedings in which the TTAB applied the “reasonable manner” approach to
consider applicants’ proposed registration of typed, block, or script marks).
52. Id. at 1353, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
53. Id., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1259.
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unequivocally stated that the TTAB’s reasonableness approach is
54
incorrect and should not be used in future opinions.
Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V.
55
The case of Estrada v. Telefonos de Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V.
demonstrates that a trademark applicant’s ulterior motives are
sometimes fairly easy to discern, and neither the TTAB nor the
Federal Circuit looks favorably on ill-intentioned applicants.
Estrada, who lives in Mexico, applied for U.S. trademark
registration for the mark AUDITORIO TELMEX in connection with
arenas and services, including sports, concert, and convention
56
facilities and events. Telefonos opposed registration because of its
TELMEX mark, which is not registered with the PTO but has been
used in the U.S. and Mexico in connection with telecommunications
57
and other related services.
58
Telefonos had been using TELMEX in Mexico for six decades. It
sponsors a large concert arena in Guadalajara, Mexico, which,
59
notably, is called AUDITORIO TELMEX. This arena held the 2008
Latin American MTV Music Awards, an event that was telecast
60
worldwide over the Internet. Telefonos also sells telephone-calling
cards in the U.S. that display the TELMEX mark with artwork and
promotions for Telefonos-sponsored sports and entertainment
61
events.
62
The TTAB sustained the oppositions to Estrada’s applications.
The Federal Circuit also agreed that Estrada’s trademark applications
for AUDITORIO TELMEX should be denied on likelihood of
63
confusion grounds. Before the TTAB, Telefonos provided a witness
who testified that Telefonos had been selling telephone-calling cards
64
bearing the TELMEX mark in the U.S. since 2000.
The TTAB
found this activity was sufficient to establish Telefonos’s priority to
65
the TELMEX mark.
Also, the Federal Circuit noted that even though the TELMEX
2.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 1353–54, 98 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1258–59.
447 F. App’x 197 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 199.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 201, 204.
Id. at 200, 202.
Id. at 201–02.
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mark is not famous, it is a coined term, and therefore it is inherently
66
The court also concluded that other
distinctive and strong.
confusion factors, such as the real-world overlap between
telecommunication, arena, and entertainment services, supported
67
the TTAB’s decision to deny Estrada’s registration request. Based
on this evidence, Telefonos demonstrated that consumers would
likely be confused between the TELMEX and AUDITORIO TELMEX
68
marks.
The most remarkable part of this decision was that the TTAB and
the Federal Circuit considered evidence of Estrada’s bad faith when
69
applying the thirteenth DuPont confusion factor.
This catch-all
factor, which allows the TTAB to weigh “any other established fact
70
probative of the effect of use,” gives the TTAB and the court some
additional flexibility in their analyses.
In this case, the TTAB and the Federal Circuit considered Estrada’s
questionable testimony in their analyses of the thirteenth confusion
71
factor. The TTAB found that Estrada had lived in Mexico for nearly
thirty years, during which “use of [the] TELMEX mark [had] been
72
ubiquitous.”
Estrada had also lived within ten miles of the
73
Despite these clear
AUDITORIO TELMEX arena since 1980.
connections, Estrada claimed that he was unfamiliar with the
TELMEX mark, and that he chose AUDITORIO TELMEX for his
mark because it “sounds good for the services upon which it will be
74
used. Is [sic] an easy listening phrase.”
The TTAB found this
testimony disingenuous and concluded that it supported a finding of
75
76
bad faith. The Federal Circuit agreed. Even though other factors
provided enough evidence that a likelihood of confusion existed
between the two marks, this evidence of bad faith further buttressed
77
the court’s opinion.

66. Id. at 202.
67. Id. at 202–03.
68. Id. at 203.
69. Id. at 203–04.
70. Id. (quoting In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 200.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 203–04.
77. See generally id. at 201–04 (reviewing the TTAB’s assessment of the DuPont
factors). The Federal Circuit panel also highlighted TTAB’s comment that the “bad
faith would have tipped the balance to a finding of likelihood of confusion” if the
other factors had not already done so. Id. at 204.
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Craig v. Kenneth Cole Productions (LIC), Inc.
78
In Craig v. Kenneth Cole Productions (LIC), Inc., the Federal Circuit
79
affirmed, without a written opinion, the TTAB’s decision to sustain
an opposition to Craig’s application for the mark LE TIGRE used on
80
pens and on leather goods.
Kenneth Cole owns a registration for a stylized Le TIGRÉ
81
trademark for clothing, which it has used since 1979.

3.

Kenneth Cole argued that its LeTIGRÉ (stylized) mark is famous, it
is identical to the applied-for mark, and registration of Craig’s mark
82
would be likely to cause confusion and dilution. Given the Federal
Circuit’s summary affirmance of this decision, the TTAB’s opinion
illustrates the relevant analysis and reasoning supporting the
successful opposition.
The TTAB first examined the similarities between the marks and
83
concluded that the marks are nearly identical. The TTAB noted
that while Kenneth Cole’s registered mark is stylized and includes an
accent over the final “e,” these differences are minor when
considering the overall similarities of the marks in the minds of
84
consumers.
The TTAB found that this DuPont factor weighed
85
strongly in favor of Kenneth Cole.
The TTAB then looked at the next factor: the similarities of the
goods. The TTAB reiterated that goods or services do not have to be
“identical or even competitive” to be related for the purposes of this
86
analysis. That is, “[t]he goods need only be sufficiently related that
consumers would be likely to assume, upon encountering the goods
under similar marks, that the goods originate from, are sponsored or

78. Craig v. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc., 433 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(per curiam).
79. Kenneth Cole Prods. (LIC), Inc. v. Craig, 2010 WL 1233880, at *1 (T.T.A.B.
Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d, 433 F. App’x 901 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
80. Craig, 433 F. App’x at 902.
81. Kenneth Cole Prods., 2010 WL 1233880, at *1.
82. Id. at *1.
83. Id. at *5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *6.
86. Id. at *8.

TRADEMARK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2011 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

6/14/2012 6:56 PM

1161
87

authorized by, or are otherwise connected to the same source.”
When considering this factor, the TTAB relied on testimony from
Kenneth Cole’s trademark and licensing manager, who cited other
luxury brands such as COACH, LOUIS VUITTON, and KATE SPADE
as companies that have used the same mark on clothing, pens, and
88
planners. Another witness testified that companies in this industry
regularly sell both clothing and small leather goods under the same
89
mark.
Even though the goods associated with Kenneth Cole’s
registration were different from those listed in Craig’s application,
the TTAB ultimately found that this factor also weighed in favor of
90
Kenneth Cole.
The TTAB also considered the other DuPont factors and found that
91
they were either neutral or weighed in favor of Kenneth Cole.
Based on its analysis, the TTAB found likelihood of confusion and
92
sustained the opposition.
The TTAB did not address the dilution claim because it had
already sustained the opposition on likelihood of confusion
93
grounds.
The TTAB explained in its likelihood of confusion
analysis that although Kenneth Cole had shown its mark was strong, it
94
had not demonstrated that the mark was famous.
The TTAB
distinguished between evidence of fame and evidence of a strong
mark. In evaluating the strength of the mark, the TTAB focused on
the fact that the mark was arbitrary for clothing, pens, and leather
95
goods and commented that the mark is well known. Considering
fame, however, the TTAB emphasized that Kenneth Cole had not
provided any financial information about sales and advertising of
96
LeTIGRÉ clothing.
Without this evidence, the TTAB could not
97
assess the mark’s exposure to the media and the public. Because
87. Id. Kenneth Cole also argued that it had common law rights to the use of its
mark on other goods, but the TTAB limited its analysis to the goods listed in
Kenneth Cole’s registration because Kenneth Cole had not established priority of use
on the additional goods. Id. at *4.
88. Id. at *8–9.
89. Id. at *9.
90. Id.
91. See id. at *9–10 (finding that because the trade channels and classes of
purchasers of the goods in question have no restrictions, there is likely overlap
between the goods of both parties); see also id. at *7–8 (holding that the third-party
use of the same or similar marks on similar goods did not weigh in favor of either
Kenneth Cole or Craig).
92. Id. at *10.
93. Id. at *10 n.10.
94. Id. at *10.
95. Id. at *7.
96. Id. at *6.
97. Id.
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Kenneth Cole did not meet its burden of proving the mark was
98
famous, the dilution claim would have failed anyway.
Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp.
99
In Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., a per curiam judgment
without opinion, the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision to
sustain three oppositions: two based on likelihood of confusion
100
grounds, and one based on functionality grounds.
The
functionality issue will be discussed in a later section.
This case involved three dueling oppositions between Brinkmann
101
Corporation and Mag Instrument.
Mag Instrument opposed
Brinkmann’s application to register MAGNUM MAXFIRE for
flashlights, and Brinkmann opposed both Mag Instrument’s
application to register MAG STAR for flashlights, flashlight
accessories, and flashlight parts, as well as Mag Instrument’s
application to register a “dual band” configuration mark for
102
flashlights.
In the first proceeding, which dealt with Brinkmann’s application
for MAGNUM MAXFIRE, Mag Instrument argued that Brinkmann’s
MAGNUM MAXFIRE mark was likely to cause confusion with Mag
103
Instrument’s MAG-NUM STAR mark.
In an interesting move,
104
Brinkmann asserted a Morehouse defense, named after the case from
105
which it originated. An applicant may use a Morehouse defense to a
likelihood of confusion claim only when the defending party already
owns an unchallenged registration for a mark that is the same or
106
substantially identical to its challenged mark.
Also, the
unchallenged mark must be associated with goods or services that are
the same or substantially similar to those it seeks to cover with the
107
new mark.
Brinkmann argued that its registration of MAGNUM
MAX for hand-held electrical spotlights met the criteria for a
4.

98. Id. at *10 n.10.
99. Nos. 2011-1052, -1053, 2011 WL 5400095, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 9, 2011) (per
curiam).
100. Id. The court also sustained another Brinkmann opposition because the
proposed mark is functional. See infra Part I.B.1.
101. Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1701, 1705–
06 (T.T.A.B. 2010).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1710–11.
104. Id. at 1711.
105. Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland & Co., 407 F.2d 881, 160 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 715 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
106. Id. at 884, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 717.
107. Id., 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 717. The policy motivation for this defense is that
the opposer could not be harmed further by a new registration for a mark for goods
so similar to the existing mark. Id., 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 717.
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108

successful Morehouse defense. The TTAB disagreed and found that
MAGNUM MAXFIRE and MAGNUM MAX are not substantially
109
It also found that flashlights and hand-held electric
identical.
spotlights are not similar enough to meet the threshold for
110
application of the defense.
Thus, the TTAB concluded that
111
Brinkmann could not use the Morehouse defense.
112
The TTAB then explored the strong similarity of the marks.
Although MAG-NUM STAR (Mag Instrument’s mark) and MAGNUM
MAXFIRE do not look or sound identical in their entirety, both
marks have a nearly identical dominant element: the first word
113
“MAGNUM.” The TTAB also remarked that STAR and MAXFIRE
both “suggest[] brilliance or illumination of the highest
114
magnitude.”
The TTAB found that the other relevant DuPont factors—the
similarity of the goods, channels of trade, and classes of consumers—
also favored Mag Instrument and so “the relevant DuPont factors
115
weigh[ed] in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.” Thus,
116
the TTAB sustained this opposition.
The TTAB’s analysis of Brinkmann’s opposition to Mag
Instrument’s requested registration of MAG STAR proceeded in a
similar manner. The TTAB found that the two marks—Brinkmann’s
MAXSTAR and Mag Instrument’s MAG STAR—differed only by one
117
letter and one space. The TTAB did not accept Mag Instrument’s
argument that customers would recognize the “MAG” part of the
118
MAG STAR mark as referring to Mag Instrument.
Thus, the
119
The TTAB also
similarity of the marks factor favored Brinkmann.
found that the other relevant DuPont factors favored the opposing
120
party, Brinkmann. Therefore, the TTAB concluded that there was
108. Mag Instrument, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
109. Id. at 1711.
110. Id. at 1712 (citation omitted) (“The Morehouse defense requires the goods to
be identical, substantially the same, or so related as to represent in law a distinction
without a difference.”).
111. Id. at 1712.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1712–13.
114. Id. at 1713.
115. Id. at 1713–14.
116. Id. at 1714.
117. See id. (noting that “[v]isually, the only real difference is the third letter in
each mark, ‘g’ and ‘x’ respectively”).
118. Id. at 1715. The TTAB also mentioned that “it has been long held that the
family of marks doctrine is unavailable to a defendant as a defense in an inter partes
proceeding.” Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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a likelihood of confusion between the marks and sustained the
121
opposition.
B. Functionality
Mag Instrument, Inc. v. Brinkmann Corp.
Mag Instrument also had to defend a proposed mark against a
122
functionality analysis. The Lanham Act does not allow registration
123
of “any matter that, as a whole, is functional.” The Supreme Court
has defined a feature as functional “if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
124
article.”
Brinkmann opposed Mag Instrument’s application to
125
register a “dual band” configuration mark on functionality grounds.
1.

In support of its functionality argument, Brinkman noted that Mag
Instrument had an expired patent, U.S. Patent No. 4,388,673, which
126
covered a rechargeable flashlight and holder.
The bands on Mag
Instrument’s patented flashlight contained a positive electrode and a
negative electrode, respectively, which allow the flashlight’s battery to
127
recharge when placed in the flashlight’s holder.
According to
Brinkmann, the dual bands are “‘necessary to charge the flashlight
128
and the reason that the charging feature works.’”
When considering the functionality issue, the first question the
129
TTAB tackled was: what actually constitutes the applied-for mark?
121. Id. at 1716.
122. Id. at 1701.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006).
124. Mag Instrument, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 4 n.10 (1982)). The
policy behind prohibiting trademark registration of functional features is that such
registration might “inhibit[] legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature.” Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 164, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1163 (1995)).
125. Id. at 1716.
126. Id. at 1718.
127. Id. at 1717.
128. Id. (quoting Brinkmann’s Opp’n Br. at 10).
129. Id. at 1716–17.

TRADEMARK.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2011 TRADEMARK LAW DECISIONS

6/14/2012 6:56 PM

1165

Brinkmann argued that the mark was merely two bands surrounding
130
a flashlight barrel. Mag Instrument argued that the mark consisted
of “two bands that are visibly contrasting from the rest of the
131
flashlight.” The distinction is important because the way the bands
132
Mag Instrument said that it
look does not affect how they work.
133
only wanted to register the visual aspects of the bands.
Referring to the Trademark Manual of Examination Procedure, the
TTAB stated that a mark consists of a description of the proposed
134
mark that an examining attorney accepts.
The description must
accurately characterize the mark and clearly explain what the mark
135
comprises.
Based on this definition, the TTAB agreed with
Brinkmann’s characterization of the mark because nothing in Mag
Instrument’s application or description indicated that the dual bands
136
must look different from the barrel.
The TTAB’s characterization of the mark—that it is just two bands
around the flashlight barrel—also sheds light on its functionality
analysis. Because the color or appearance of the bands is not part of
137
the mark, the TTAB only considered the bands themselves.
The
TTAB then applied the factors from In re Morton-Norwich Products,
138
Inc.
to the dual band mark to determine if the mark was
139
functional. Morton-Norwich lists the following factors as relevant to a
functionality analysis:
(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian
advantages of the design; (2) advertising materials in which the
originator of the design touts the design’s utilitarian advantages;
(3) the availability to competitors of functionally equivalent
designs; and (4) facts indicating that the design results in
130. Id. at 1716.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1717 (describing how Mag Instrument’s drawing of the dual bank mark
only showed their placement and not how the contrasting bands on the MAG
CHARGER flashlight exhibit are actually electrodes for charging).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1716 (citing U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINATION PROCEDURE §§ 808.02–808.03 (2d ed. 1997) (“To be satisfactory, the
description [of a mark] should state accurately what the mark comprises, and should
not create a misleading impression by either positive statement or omission of facts . .
. . The examining attorney should require a description of the mark where the mark
is three-dimensional . . . . If applicable, the description statement must clearly
indicate the portion of the product or container which the mark comprises . . . .”).
135. Id. (quoting U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 808.02 (2d ed. 1997)).
136. Id. at 1716–17 (“There is no indication in the application that the two bands
contrast with the barrel of the flashlight.”).
137. Id. at 1717.
138. 671 F.2d 1332, 213 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 9 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
139. Mag Instrument, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1718.
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comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the
140
product.

The first two factors were relevant and dispositive for the TTAB.
The TTAB paid particular attention to Mag Instrument’s expired
141
utility patent for the ring-charging flashlight.
The TTAB
determined that the patent’s abstract, drawings, and claims covered
the same features as Mag Instrument’s applied-for mark: two rings
behind the head of the flashlight that are used to recharge the
142
flashlight’s batteries.
Moreover, Mag Instrument’s advertising for this flashlight describes
the dual bands as the “charger module” and extols the benefits of the
143
charging bands as allowing the flashlight to charge in any position.
Because these two factors pointed to the utilitarian advantages of the
dual bands, the TTAB sustained Brinkmann’s opposition based on
144
the functionality doctrine.
For the sake of completeness, however, the TTAB discussed
Brinkmann’s alternative argument that Mag Instrument’s “dual
145
band” mark had not acquired secondary meaning or distinctiveness.
For trade dress or product design to receive a trademark registration
on the principal register, the applicant must show that the mark has
acquired secondary meaning, or that customers associate the design
146
with the source of the goods.
Under section 2(f) of the Lanham
Act, “nothing . . . shall prevent the registration of a mark used by the
applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in
147
commerce.” Mag Instrument applied for registration under section
148
2(f), and the PTO approved the mark for publication.
This
approval created “a presumption that the examining attorney found
that the applicant made a prima facie showing of acquired
149
distinctiveness.”
Brinkmann therefore had the initial burden of
presenting a prima facie case that Mag Instrument’s mark had not

140. Id. (citing Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1274, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
141. See id. (highlighting the “vital significance” of a prior patent in a trademark
claim).
142. Id. at 1720.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1722.
145. Id.
146. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1068 (2000).
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
148. 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1722.
149. Id. (citing Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co., 840 F.2d 1572, 1576, 6
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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150

acquired secondary meaning.
If Brinkmann successfully met its
burden, Mag Instrument would have to present additional evidence
of secondary meaning to show that it overcame Brinkmann’s
151
showing.
The TTAB found that Brinkmann met its burden when it
demonstrated that the primary significance of the dual bands is their
charging function and concluded that Mag Instrument had not
152
overcome Brinkmann’s prima facie showing.
Although Mag
Instrument submitted sixteen declarations to show acquired
distinctiveness during the prosecution of the application, the TTAB
found that the declarations had limited probative value because they
“[were] nearly identical in wording and thus [did] not appear to have
153
been prepared in the signer’s own words.”
Moreover, the
declarants were not consumers; nearly all of the declarations were
from sales representatives or others associated with the flashlight
154
retail business.
Finally, the TTAB noted that the sales and advertising evidence
that Mag Instrument submitted to show secondary meaning did not
specifically indicate the dual bands as a source identifier: “[t]here is
no evidence that Mag Instrument ever placed any ‘look for’
advertisements or otherwise made promotional efforts to create
consumer association between the dual bands, or recharging rings,
155
with the source of the flashlights.”
On the contrary, the TTAB
found that Mag Instrument’s advertising emphasized the utilitarian
156
attributes of the dual bands, not their value as a trademark. Thus,
even absent the TTAB’s conclusion that the dual bands were
functional, the TTAB found that Mag Instrument would not be
entitled to a trademark because the dual band configuration mark
157
had not acquired distinctiveness.
C. Descriptiveness; Acquired Distinctiveness
Dalton v. Honda Motor Co.
The Federal Circuit halted Dalton’s pro se attempt to defend the
158
Honda opposed
registration of the mark DEALERDASHBOARD.
1.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1723.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1724.
Id.
Dalton v. Honda Motor Co., 425 F. App’x 886, 887 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (per
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the mark at the TTAB, after its American subsidiary received a cease159
In its opposition, Honda claimed
and-desist letter from Dalton.
that, in the automotive industry, DEALERDASHBOARD “is a generic
160
term, or, at best, a merely descriptive term.” The TTAB found that
161
The TTAB further
DEALERDASHBORD is merely descriptive.
noted that Dalton had not argued that the mark had acquired
distinctiveness, so he could not overcome the TTAB’s finding that the
162
mark was merely descriptive.
On appeal, Dalton argued that the TTAB should not have found
that the mark was merely descriptive, and it should have considered
third-party registrations containing the terms DEALER or
163
DASHBOARD.
Beginning with the descriptiveness issue, the
Federal Circuit reviewed the dictionary definition of the term
“dealer” in the record, which is “one engaged in buying and
164
selling.”
The court then considered what the word “dashboard”
165
means in context. Relying on evidence that Honda submitted, the
court defined this type of dashboard as “an Internet-based system that
166
The court
provides dealers with key performance indicators.”
noted that the TTAB also relied on the listing of services Dalton
167
identified in his application.
The services listing described a
DEALERDASHBOARD as “the graphical display of sales, service and
other information relating to businesses engaged in buying and
168
selling goods, particularly automobiles.”
After considering this evidence, the court adopted the TTAB’s
conclusion that Dalton’s mark “merely describes, without conjecture
169
or speculation” the services listing.
Finally, the court agreed with
Honda that, in this situation, Dalton’s combination of two terms does
170
not change the descriptive nature of the mark. The court, like the
curiam).
159. Id.
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id. at 889.
162. Id. The TTAB and the Federal Circuit also addressed procedural issues of
standing and admissibility of evidence. See infra Part II.A.1.
163. Id. at 891.
164. Id. at 892 (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See id. at 893 (quoting In re Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1018, 1020 (T.T.A.B. 1983)) (noting that a combination of descriptive terms
might be registrable “if the juxtaposition of the words is inventive or evokes a unique
commercial impression, or if the term has a bizarre or incongruous meaning as
applied to the goods”).
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TTAB, noted that Dalton did not assert in his application that his
mark had acquired secondary meaning, and he offered no evidence
171
Therefore, the court upheld the TTAB’s
to support such a claim.
conclusion that DEALERDASHBOARD is a merely descriptive
172
mark.
On the question of third-party registrations, the Federal Circuit
reminded Dalton that “a merely descriptive mark does not qualify for
registration simply because other similar marks appear on the
173
register.”
Thus, it concluded that the TTAB was justified when it
considered only the registrability of Dalton’s mark in the context of
174
the relevant services.
Consequently, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the TTAB’s decision to sustain Honda’s opposition and refuse
175
Dalton’s registration of the mark.
II. PROCEDURAL TRADEMARK ISSUES
The Federal Circuit’s procedural decisions in 2011 demonstrate
that the court takes the TTAB’s discovery process seriously. It showed
little sympathy for TTAB litigants who failed to follow procedural
rules, even if the meaning or effect of certain rules may be subject to
debate.
A. Standing to Sue; Admissibility of Evidence
Dalton v. Honda Motor Co.
176
In addition to the substantive questions discussed above, the
Dalton opinion covered the procedural issues of standing and
177
whether late-produced evidence may be excluded from the record.
Dalton argued that Honda did not have standing to oppose his
registration because Honda is a foreign corporation, and he had only
178
sent a cease-and-desist letter to American Honda. American Honda
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Honda Motor Company, the parent
179
company that filed the opposition.
The standing requirements for oppositions are conferred both by
statute, in section 13 of the Lanham Act, and by common law judicial
1.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 893–94.
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.C.1.
425 F. App’x at 889–91, 894–95.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.
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decisions that interpret the statutory standing requirements.
The
Lanham Act allows anyone “who believes that he would be damaged
181
The judicially-created
by the registration of a mark” to oppose it.
standard for demonstrating standing further requires a showing of:
“(1) a ‘real interest’ in the proceeding; and (2) a ‘reasonable basis’
for believing that [the opposer] would suffer damage if the mark is
182
registered.”
The court explained that a parent company has standing to oppose
a trademark application on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary
because damage to the subsidiary could lead to damage to the parent
183
company. That Honda Motor Company is a foreign entity did not
184
The Federal Circuit commented that
factor into this analysis.
although the TTAB did not discuss the parent-subsidiary relationship
in its decision, it applied the correct test to find that Honda Motor
185
Company, the parent company, had standing. Therefore, the court
concluded that the TTAB correctly determined that Honda Motor
186
Company had standing to oppose Dalton’s registration.
The final procedural point in this case involved the TTAB’s
decision to exclude documents Dalton attempted to introduce
during his deposition. During the discovery period, Dalton initially
failed to respond to Honda’s discovery requests, and he produced a
small set of documents only after the TTAB issued an order granting
187
Honda’s motion to compel discovery.
At his deposition, however,
Dalton sought to introduce a large number of documents that he had
188
not previously provided.
The TTAB cited, with approval, other cases in which it had
189
excluded evidence that had not been produced during discovery.
Moreover, the TTAB noted that the excluded evidence would not
190
change the outcome of the case.
Based on these considerations,
the Federal Circuit affirmed the TTAB’s decision to exclude the
191
evidence.

180. Id. at 889–90 (citing Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
181. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2006)).
182. Id. at 890 (citing Simpson, 170 F.3d at 1095, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1025).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 890–91.
185. Id. at 891.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 894–95.
188. Id. at 895.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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B. Default Judgment; Timing of Suspension
Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc.
The final Federal Circuit trademark decision issued in 2011
192
covered purely procedural issues in a precedential decision.
Additionally, this case cost the trademark owner his registration—just
193
one week after he had renewed it.
Benedict held trademark registrations for G THE GOODYMAN for
pepperoni sticks and bakery goods like cupcakes, cookies, and
194
donuts.

1.

Super Bakery applied for a trademark registration for GOODY MAN
195
for similar bakery goods.
The examining attorney rejected Super Bakery’s application,
stating that the proposed mark was likely to be confused with
196
Benedict’s mark.
In July 2007, after this rejection, Super Bakery
asked the PTO to cancel Benedict’s mark, arguing that Benedict had
197
abandoned the mark and committed fraud.
In January and
198
February 2008, Super Bakery served discovery requests on Benedict.
Beginning in mid-February 2008, Benedict, a pro se party, failed to
respond to several pleadings in the proceeding, including discovery
requests, a motion to compel discovery, and the TTAB’s order
199
granting the motion to compel.
In August 2008, Super Bakery
192. Benedict v. Super Bakery, Inc., 665 F.3d 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1089
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
193. Benedict filed his Section 8 application to renew the mark on Dec. 16, 2011,
and the PTO accepted the renewal on Dec. 20, 2011. See Prosecution History for
Registration No. 296622, TRADEMARK APPLICATIONS AND REGISTRATIONS RETRIEVAL
(TARR), available at http://tarr.uspto.gov/tarr?regser=serial&entry=78232100&
action=Request+Status. The Federal Circuit’s opinion was issued on Dec. 28, 2011.
Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089.
194. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1263, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089–90.
195. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
196. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
197. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
198. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
199. Id. at 1264–65, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1089–90.
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asked the TTAB for a default judgment based on Benedict’s failure to
200
comply with the TTAB’s order compelling a discovery response.
Benedict finally responded and filed a request for reconsideration of
the discovery order, claiming he had not received the TTAB order
201
until his time to comply had almost expired.
Although the TTAB
deemed Benedict’s response untimely, it gave him the opportunity to
respond to the discovery requests within thirty days, by March 13,
202
2009.
On March 12, 2009 (day twenty-nine), Benedict filed a motion for
summary judgment—on somewhat dubious grounds—and he still did
203
not respond to the discovery requests.
After filing his summary
204
judgment motion, he invoked Trademark Rule 2.127(d), which
states:
When any party files . . . a motion for summary judgment, or any
other motion which is potentially dispositive of a proceeding, the
case will be suspended by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
with respect to all matters not germane to the motion and no party
should file any paper which is not germane to the motion except as
otherwise specified in the Board’s suspension order. If the case is
not disposed of as a result of the motion, proceedings will be
resumed pursuant to an order of the Board when the motion is
205
decided.

In other words, under this Rule, no party is allowed to file anything
unrelated to a dispositive motion once the case has been suspended.
206
The TTAB issued its order suspending the case on March 30, 2009.
Two weeks later, Super Bakery asked the TTAB for sanctions,
207
default judgment, and cancellation of Benedict’s mark. The TTAB
agreed, stating that the case was not actually suspended until after the
TTAB issued a suspension order, so Benedict was still required to
meet the March 13 discovery deadline after he filed his summary
208
judgment brief.
The TTAB entered default judgment against
209
Benedict and cancelled the mark.
In 2010, Benedict appealed the decision to the Federal Circuit,
which sent the case back to the TTAB because the TTAB had not
200. Id. at 1265, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
201. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
202. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
203. Id. at 1265–66, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090–91.
204. 37 C.F.R. § 2.127(d) (2011).
205. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1265–66, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090 (quoting 37
C.F.R. § 2.127(d)).
206. Id. at 1266, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
207. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1090.
208. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
209. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
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clearly explained in its prior opinion how Trademark Rule 2.127(d)
210
applied to the facts of this case. In response to the Federal Circuit’s
remand, the TTAB elaborated on its interpretation and application
211
of Trademark Rule 2.127(d) to this case.
The TTAB primarily
relied on a comment and response made during the formal noticeand-comment process after the rule was proposed:
Comment: One organization suggested the section should be
amended to provide that the filing of a potentially dispositive
motion automatically suspends proceedings, without any action by
the Board.
Response: The suggested modification has not been adopted. A
variety of motions are potentially dispositive, including a motion
for sanctions in the form of entry of judgment. Because of the
number of situations in which a party may make a potentially
dispositive motion, it is believed better for the Board to determine
whether proceedings should be suspended based on the situation
212
presented by the particular case.

The TTAB concluded that the comment indicates a case is not
213
suspended the moment a summary judgment motion is filed.
Rather, the case continues to move forward until the TTAB actually
214
issues a suspension order.
The TTAB also noted that “there was ‘a strong showing of willful
evasion’ of discovery” on Benedict’s part and ruled that his summary
215
judgment motion was “without merit.”
Benedict appealed the
TTAB’s second decision, arguing that the TTAB’s interpretation of
216
the rule is not what the plain language of the rule actually states.
217
Benedict claimed that he followed the rule as it is written.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Benedict that the TTAB’s
interpretation of Trademark Rule 2.127(d) is not dictated by the

210. See Flohr et al., supra note 3, at 1195–96 (summarizing the procedural history
and the Federal Circuit’s 2010 opinion of Benedict).
211. Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1266, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
212. Id. at 1266–67, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091 (quoting Miscellaneous
Changes to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,081, 48,094
(Sept. 9, 1998)).
213. Id. at 1267, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
214. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091.
215. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091–92. Benedict argued that the doctrine of
res judicata barred Super Bakery’s petition for cancellation based on the examining
attorney’s final office action issued with respect to Super Bakery’s application. Id.,
101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091–92. The office action stated that there was a
likelihood of confusion between Super Bakery’s mark and Mr. Benedict’s registered
mark. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091–92.
216. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
217. Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
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218

plain language of the rule.
On this point, the court concluded,
“[t]his ambiguity [in the language of the rule] does not support the
219
extreme sanction of default judgment.”
The court affirmed the TTAB’s decision, however, because of
220
Benedict’s behavior.
In spite of the ambiguity in Trademark Rule
2.127(d), Benedict clearly violated the Trademark Rules concerning
221
responding to discovery requests and complying with TTAB orders.
Furthermore, Trademark Rule 2.120(g) states clearly that “if a party
fails to comply with an order of the Trademark Trial and Appeal
Board relating to disclosure or discovery” the TTAB may issue an
222
appropriate order to remedy the violation.
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that Benedict’s long history of
ignoring his obligations in this case justified the TTAB’s order
223
entering default judgment and cancelling Benedict’s mark.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the Federal Circuit’s 2011 trademark decisions did not
introduce major changes to trademark law and doctrine. However,
the court’s Citigroup and Benedict decisions identified areas where the
TTAB should hone or clarify its rules and practices. Also, the Estrada
and Benedict opinions indicated the Federal Circuit’s expectation of
cooperation and candor from litigants at the TTAB. So although the
Federal Circuit issued few trademark decisions last year, those
decisions still provide insight into the court’s approach to trademark
law and procedure.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id. at 1268, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092–93.
Id., 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1092.
37 C.F.R. § 2.120(g) (2011).
Benedict, 665 F.3d at 1269, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1093.

